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RECOVERY FOR "LOSS OF CHANCE" IN A WRONGFUL
DEATH ACTION-Herskovits v. Group Health, 99 Wn. 2d 609, 664
P.2d 474 (1983).
In Herskovits v. Group Health, I the Washington Supreme Court held
that loss of a less-than-50% chance of survival is a compensable injury
under the Washington wrongful death statute. 2 The court did not agree,
however, on the proper method for determining causation in a loss of
chance case. Neither of the two methods of causation analysis proposed
by the court is satisfactory. Recovery for loss of a less-than-50% chance
of survival is not possible under traditional causation principles, and
should be allowed only if a court is willing to adopt a possibility standard
of proof and adjust damages to reflect the uncertainty of causation.
This Note first outlines the policy justifications for allowing recovery
for loss of a less-than-50% chance of survival. It then describes and
evaluates the attempts by the Herskovits plurality and "lead" opinions to
solve the causation problem. It concludes that neither approach is analyti-
cally successful, and that only a result-oriented approach can lead to re-
covery. Under this result-oriented approach, a court would adopt a possi-
bility standard of proof for causation, and assess damages based on the
statistical likelihood of causation.
I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Herskovits died of lung cancer approximately two years after doc-
tors discovered a tumor and removed one of his lungs. Mrs. Herskovits,
his wife and personal representative, brought a wrongful death action 3
against Group Health Hospital alleging medical malpractice because of
Group Health's failure to diagnose the cancer earlier. Group Health filed
a motion for summary judgment.
At the summary judgment hearing, Mrs. Herskovits presented an affi-
davit by the private doctor whose independent examination finally led to
diagnosis of Mr. Herskovits' cancer. The doctor stated that Group Health
1. 99 Wn. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474(1983).
2. The plaintiff claimed damages consistent with both the Washington wrongful death statute,
WASH. REv. CODE § 4.20.010 (1984), and the Washington survival statutes, id. §§ 4.20.046, .060.
See Record at 240, Herskovits v. Group Health, 99 Wn. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983). The Hersko-
vits court, however, viewed the action as a wrongful death action. In the plurality opinion Justice
Pearson expressly indicated that the action was a wrongful death action. 99 Wn. 2d at 635 n. 1, 664
P.2d at 487 n. 1. In the "lead" opinion, although Justice Dore stated that the action was a survivor-
ship action, id. at 611, 664 P.2d at 475, he later defined the compensable injury as death, id. at 614,
664 P.2d at 476-77.
3. See supra note 2.
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could have diagnosed the tumor through testing six months earlier, when
Mr. Herskovits sought treatment from Group Health for a chronic cough. 4
He indicated that the delay in diagnosis probably reduced Mr. Herskovits'
chance of survival "substantially.' '5 He also indicated that the reduction
in five-year6 chance of survival could have been as much as a 14% drop.
from a 39% chance of survival at the time the tumor should have been
diagnosed to a 25% chance of survival at the time it was diagnosed. 7
The trial court granted Group Health's summary judgment motion be-
cause it found that Mrs. Herskovits had failed to establish that Group
Health caused Mr. Herskovits' death. 8 The trial court based its finding on
traditional causation principles, which require proof under the but-for
test,9 and a probability standard l° that the defendant's conduct was a
cause-in-fact of the injury. The court found that Mrs. Herskovits could
not meet the traditional test, because she could not prove that but for the
negligent conduct of Group Health, Mr. Herskovits' death probably
would not have occurred within five years. She could not prove this be-
cause even in the absence of negligence, the probability that Mr. Hersko-
vits would have survived for five years was less than 50%.
The Washington Supreme Court accepted a direct appeal from Mrs.
Herskovits. For purposes of appeal, the parties stipulated that Group
4. Mr. Herskovits was a long-time patient of Group Health. was almost 60 years old and had a
history of smoking. Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 612, 620, 664 P.2d at 475. 480.
5. Id. at 622,664 P.2d at 480.
Group Health's doctor disagreed. He testified that earlier diagnosis would not have prevented Mr.
Herskovits' death nor lengthened his life. He stated that this type of cancer is virtually certain to
cause death within several years regardless of when the tumor is diagnosed. Id. at 612. 664 P.2d at
475.
6. "Survival" in lung cancer cases is defined as five years. Brief of Appellant at 14 n 3. Hersko-
vits v. Group Health, 99 Wn. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983). Thus, a statistic such as 39% chance of
survival refers to a 39% chance of surviving for five years after diagnosis.
7. A cancerous tumor increases in size over time, and the patient's chances of survival decline
accordingly. Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 621, 664 P.2d at 480. When discovered. Mr. Herskovits"
tumor was a "'stage 2" tumor. Id. at 621, 664 P.2d at 480. The private doctor testified that the tumor
might have been only a "'stage I" tumor when it should have been diagnosed six months earlier. Id.
He indicated that the statistical chance of survival after discovery of a "stage I'" tumor is 39%. while
the statistical chance of survival after discovery of a "stage 2" tumor is 25%. Id.
The doctor also testified, however, that he could not indicate in terms of certainty. probability, or
statistical chance the likelihood of the tumor's being at "stage I " six months earlier. Id. at 622. 664
P.2d at 480. He did state that tumors do increase in size over time, and the patient's chance of
survival declines accordingly. Id. at 621, 664 P.2d at 480.
8. Id. at 621,664 P.2d at 480.
9. The Washington Supreme Court has stated that cause-in-fact can be established by proving
that but for the breach of duty, the injury would not have occurred. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis. Inc..
98 Wn. 2d 460. 476, 656 P.2d 483, 493 (1983); King v. Seattle. 84 Wn. 2d 239. 249. 525 P.2d 228.
234(1974).
10. The Washington Supreme Court has also stated that in medical malpractice cases. cause-in-
fact must be established by expert testimony and the standard of proof for such testimony is one of
probability. O'Donoghue v. Riggs, 73 Wn. 2d 814, 824, 440 P.2d 823. 830 (1968).
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Health was negligent, and that Group Health's negligence proximately
caused a 14% drop in Mr. Herskovits' chance of survival. They also sti-
pulated that Mr. Herskovits would have had less than a 50% chance of
survival even with timely diagnosis. The supreme court reversed the trial
court and remanded the case for trial on the merits. The supreme court
split four ways, however, and failed to produce a majority opinion. I The
"lead" opinion and plurality opinion justices departed from traditional
causation principles to reach their results.
II. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COMPENSATING LOSS OF A
LESS-THAN-50% CHANCE OF SURVIVAL
Although a plaintiff like Mrs. Herskovits cannot recover under tradi-
tional causation principles,12 a court may feel at least some of the burden
of harm should be shifted to the defendant. This would be based on pre-
cedents such as Summers v. Tice13 and Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 14
in which courts faced with uncertainty of causation decided to place the
burden of harm on negligent defendants rather than innocent plaintiffs.
Those cases, however, are distinguishable from the Herskovits situation.
In those cases, it was certain that one of the defendants negligently caused
the harm, although it was impossible to prove which defendants were re-
sponsible. In Herskovits, on the other hand, the hospital's negligence
may have caused the patient's death (if the cancer had been diagnosed and
treated earlier, Mr. Herskovits might have survived five years), or it may
have had no effect at all on the course of his disease (even with timely
diagnosis, Mr. Herskovits might have died within five years). Thus, shift-
ing liability to the defendant in Herskovits would be more tenuous than in
the other cases. Nonetheless, a court may feel that denying any recovery
to the plaintiff would be harsh. 15
A court may also wish to allow recovery in order to deter others in the
medical profession from negligence. 16 According to this view, if doctors
11. Two justices, Dore and Rosellini, joined in the "lead" opinion; four justices, Pearson, Wil-
liams, Stafford, and Utter, joined in the concurring opinion; and three justices, Brachtenbach, Dim-
mick, and Dolliver, dissented in two separate opinions.
12. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
13. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (two hunters were both capable of firing the shot which
injured plaintiff; court assigned joint and several liablility).
14. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (each of several defendant drug manufac-
turers could not prove that it could not have produced the drug that injured plaintiff. The court as-
signed liability based on the probability that each defendant caused the injury-its percentage share
of the market for that drug), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
15. Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 620, 664 P.2d at 479.
16. Although deterrence is a secondary purpose of tort law, which seldom has controlling force,
courts often give it weight. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 23 (4th ed. 1971).
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and hospitals are shielded from liability for negligent conduct resulting in
loss of a less-than-50% chance of survival, they might be less inclined to
perform the full spectrum of diagnostic and treatment procedures in seem-
ingly hopeless cases. This would be especially likely given the ever-in-
creasing emphasis on cost control in modern medical care. 17
III. THE HERSKOVITS PLURALITY OPINION-REDEFINING
THE INJURY
In the Herskovits plurality opinion, Justice Pearson endeavored to al-
low recovery for Mrs. Herskovits without contravening the traditional
principles of causation. 18 To accomplish this, he defined the compensable
injury not as the death, but as the loss of chance of survival itself. 19 Mrs.
Herskovits could show, under the traditional principles, that but for
Group Health's conduct, Mr. Herskovits' loss of chance of survival prob-
ably would not have occurred.
On its face, this approach appears to solve the causation problem.
However, the redefinition is only an exercise in semantics. It hides the
inescapable fact that loss of chance of survival in itself is no injury until
death or other physical harm ensues. 20 The true injury is death, and the
Justice Dore in the Herskovits "'lead" opinion referred to deterrence as a ground for allowing recov-
ery. 99 Wn. 2d at 614, 664 P.2d at 477.
17. The deterrence theory is problematic, however. The effects of deterrence might go too far by
discouraging doctors from using innovative techniques. If fear of potential malpractice liability
caused doctors to refrain from using techniques which carried a risk of loss of chance of survival.
some patients might be denied potentially successful treatment. Society should encourage rather than
discourage doctors' taking of such risks. Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 637-38, 642. 664 P.2d at 488. 491
(Brachtenbach, J., dissenting); Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN L. REV 60. 85-88
(1956).
The problem of discouraging doctors' risk-taking could be avoided, however, if judges carefully
instruct juries that a doctor is liable only when he fails to comply with an accepted standard of care-
not when he reasonably employs a somewhat risky technique with the patient's consent. Such instruc-
tions should help juries to distinguish between true malpractice and a patient's knowing assumption
of risk when he agrees to his doctor's use of a certain technique.
18. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
19. Herskovits. 99 Wn. 2d at 624. 664 P.2d at 481. Justice Pearson found support for defining
the injury as the loss of chance itself in three cases from other jurisdictions: O'Brien v. Stover, 443
F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1971), Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970). and James v. United
States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980). Herskovits. 99 Wn. 2d at 632. 664 P.2d at 485.
20. See W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 30, at 143 (the threat of future harm. not yet realized, is
not a compensable injury).
The argument for recognizing loss of chance as the compensable injury in itself is extensively
outlined in King, Causation. Valuation. and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting
Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981). King suggests broad-ranging re-
forms of the tort damage evaluation system that would essentially require almost every case-even
cases with a greater-than-50% probability of causation-to be considered a loss of chance case. with
the plaintiff recovering a percentage of full recovery based on the percent likelihood of causation.
King's method does not provide answers, however, to the issues raised infra in notes 21-26 and
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ultimate causation issue is whether the loss of chance caused the death.
Thus, Justice Pearson's redefinition of the injury conceals rather than
solves the causation problem.
Several factors point to the conclusion that the death, not the loss of
chance, is the true injury in Herskovits. First, if the loss of chance itself
were the actual injury, a court would logically have to provide compensa-
tion to a plaintiff who suffered a loss of chance but "beat the odds" and
survived five years. This result seems anomalous, because the survivor
would have suffered no actual damage from the loss of chance. 21 If such a
suit were brought, the fact that loss of chance alone produces no injury
would seem obvious.
Second, Justice Pearson had to struggle to fit his causation analysis
within Washington's wrongful death statute. Redefining the harm as
"loss of chance" rather than "death" seems to place recovery outside the
bounds of the statute, which permits an action for damages only when
"death" is caused. 22 Justice Pearson essentially sidestepped the statutory
problem by suggesting that courts interpret the statute to mean that a de-
fendant will "cause" death whenever he causes a substantial reduction in
a decedent's chance of survival. 23 Justice Pearson supported his liberal
construction of the statute by pointing out that the word "cause" already
has a "notoriously elusive" meaning. 24
Third, Justice Pearson's method of damage assessment was essentially
built on the concept of death as the injury. 25 As compensation for loss of
chance, Justice Pearson would award the value of the life multiplied by
the percentage chance of survival lost. 26 Although loss of chance is the
accompanying text. He insists that there is "inherent worth" in a chance, which should be recog-
nized and compensated. Id. at 1378.
21. A survivor might be able to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress rather than
loss of chance if he demonstrated "objective symptomatology." Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wn. 2d 424,
436, 553 P.2d 1096, 1103 (1976). (Recovery for emotional distress is not possible in a wrongful
death action, however. See WASH. REv. CODE § 4.20.010 (1984)).
22. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.20.010 (1984).
23. Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 634-35,664 P.2d at 487.
24. Id.at635n.1,664P.2dat487n.l.
This justification is weak. Many legal terms have elusive meanings, but that fact does not ordinar-
ily replace consideration of legislative intent as the basis for reinterpretatin of a statute.
25. Because Herskovits was an appeal from a summary judgment, the justices did not assess
damages. They did, however, consider the general method of damage assessment that should be used
by ajury finding liability in a Herskovits-type trial. Id. at 618-19, 635,664 P.2d at 478-79, 487. The
justices' very brief expositions on this subject are hard to understand and fail to give meaningful
guidance to a trial judge. See infra notes 26, 27 (discussion of damage assessment methods).
26. Justice Pearson implied that he would first ask a jury to compute a figure representing the
value of Mr. Herskovits' life at the time the tumor should have been discovered. He would then
discount that value-of-life figure by multiplying it by a figure representing the percentage chance lost
because of Group Health's negligence. Justice Pearson indicated that he would use this method of
damage assessment by citing with approval a passage from King, supra note 20, at 1382. Herskovits,
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alleged injury, the actual injury being valued is the underlying death.
Multiplying by the chance of survival is merely a way of acknowledging
the uncertainty of causation. Thus, Justice Pearson's own measure of
damages belies his premise that the compensable injury is loss of chance.
The device of redefining the injury in a wrongful death action is ulti-
mately ineffective. The true injury is the death, and focusing attention on
whether the defendant caused the loss of chance begs the ultimate ques-
tion of whether the defendant caused the death. Although Mrs. Hersko-
vits can show that the defendant probably caused the loss of chance, she
cannot show that the loss of chance probably caused the death. This is the
key question. If the loss of chance had nothing to do with the death, there
was no injury.
Justice Pearson's approach of redefining the harm to be the loss of
chance itself does not resolve the issue of whether there was injury. It
dodges the question of whether the loss of chance caused the death. Thus,
Justice Pearson's analysis never addresses the true liability issue.
IV. THE HERSKOVITS "LEAD" OPINION-AN ALTERNATIVE
TO THE BUT-FOR TEST
In the Herskovits "lead" opinion, Justice Dore properly focused on
death as the injury, but also failed to solve the causation problem. Justice
Dore chose a different way of deviating from traditional causation princi-
ples in order to allow recovery for Mrs. Herskovits. Unlike Justice Pear-
son, he did not redefine the injury; he acknowledged that the compensable
injury was Mr. Herskovits' death.2 7 Instead, he proposed adoption of an
99 Wn. 2d at 635, 664 P.2d at 487. The passage referred to a situation where a patient died after
negligent misdiagnosis of a heart attack. The patient had a 40% chance of survival absent negligence
and the plaintiff could show that the defendant reduced the patient's chance from 40% to 0%. King
suggested that a jury determining recovery in that situation would compute the value of decedent's
life, assuming he had survived the heart attack, and then multiply that value-of-life figure by 40%.
King stated that the measure of a compensable chance is "the percentage probability by which the
defendant's tortious conduct diminished the likelihood of achieving some more favorable outcome.
King, supra note 20, at 1382.
Justice Pearson did not illustrate application of King's discount method to the facts of Herskovits.
A motion for reconsideration requesting the addition to Justice Pearson's opinion of an explicit refer-
ence to use of a 14% multiplier under the Herskovits facts was rejected. 99 Wn. 2d at 645. The court
provided no opinion explaining its denial of this motion, but its reasons may have been based on
concerns regarding the applicability of a statistical figure to a particular patient. See infra note 41 and
accompanying text.
Justice Pearson did not find guidance in prior cases as to the exact method a jury should use to
assess loss of chance damages. He suggested that courts in the prior loss of chance cases that defined
the compensable harm to be the loss of chance "implicitly" advocated use of King's method. Id. at
632, 664 P.2d at 486.
27. Id. at 614, 664 P.2d at 476-77.
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alternative to the but-for test of causation, at least at the prima facie
level. 28 Under Justice Dore's alternative prima facie test, medical evi-
dence that the defendant caused the death would be unnecessary. A plain-
tiff could raise an issue of material fact merely through presenting medi-
cal evidence that the defendant "increase[d] the risk of harm" 29 to the
plaintiff (in other words, decreased the patient's chance of survival).
Under this alternative test, Mrs. Herskovits could avoid summary judg-
ment, because she could show that Group Health probably decreased Mr.
Herskovits' chance of survival.
Use of the alternative test at the prima facie level, however, does not
solve the Herskovits causation problem. 30 At trial, Mrs. Herskovits
would still have to meet the traditional but-for test-she would have to
show that Group Health probably caused Mr. Herskovits' death. Contrary
to a suggestion in Justice Dore's opinion, Mrs. Herskovits could not re-
cover merely by showing that the loss of chance was a substantial factor
in causing the death. 31 Use of the alternative test at the prima facie level
28. Id. at 619, 664 P.2d at 479. The new test is drawn from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §
323 (1965). Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 613, 664 P.2d at 476. Section 323 states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he
should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to
liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm ....
RESTATEMENT, supra.
The appropriateness of basing a causation test on § 323 is questionable. Section 323 appears in a
portion of the Restatement that describes affirmative duties, not causation. The Restatement authors
probably wrote the sections in that portion of the Restatement with the assumption that causation was
assumed in the situations described. This is apparent from the wording of § 323 itself, which indi-
cates that liability exists for physical harm "resulting" from the actor's failure to exercise care.
29. Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 613,664 P.2d at 476.
30. The court that originated use of the alternative § 323 test at the prima facie level did so in a
case where plaintiff could meet the traditional causation requirement with its but-for test and proba-
bility standard. In Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978), testimony indicated that
but for the defendant's negligent conduct, the decedent would have had a 75% chance of survival.
392 A.2d at 1288 n.9.
The Hamil court invoked the alternative § 323 test merely as a means of accommodating Pennsyl-
vania's certainty standard of proof for medical testimony of cause-in-fact. 392 A.2d at 1288; King,
supra note 20, at 1367 n.44. The Pennsylvania court recognized that, in a case involving the question
of whether an independent source of harm would have caused the same result even in the absence of
defendant's conduct, requiring an expert to testify with certainty on but-for causation would be unrea-
sonable. Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1288. Washington courts do not face this problem because Washington
already follows a probability rather than certainty standard of proof for medical testimony of cause-
in-fact. O'Donoghue v. Riggs, 73 Wn. 2d 814, 824, 440 P.2d 823, 830 (1968).
31. Justice Dore's suggestion that a jury in a Herskovits-type trial should use the "substantial
factor" test, 99 Wn. 2d at 616, 617, 664 P.2d at 477, 478, does not obviate the but-for requirement.
The but-for requirement is incorporated in the substantial factor test, except in situations in which
each of two forces combining to produce an injury could have alone produced the injury. RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 28 § 432. In Herskovits, Group Health's negligence could not have produced Mr.
Herskovits' death without the preexisting disease.
Washington Law Review
in Herskovits is thus ineffective. The plaintiff survives a summary judg-
ment motion only to proceed to trial lacking evidence sufficient to meet
the standard of proof.
A court could allow a plaintiff like Mrs. Herskovits to recover only by
lowering the standard of proof. Under a lower standard of proof, a Her-
skovits jury could find for Mrs. Herskovits if she merely showed that but
for Group Health's conduct Mr. Herskovits' death possibly, rather than
probably, would not have occurred within five years. Summary judgment
would then be inappropriate, and Justice Dore's result would be correct.
Use of a possibility standard of proof is unfair, however. It contradicts
the basic notion that a mere possibility of causation is not enough to hold
a defendant liable for injury. 32 The reasoning behind this notion is that a
jury using a possibility standard could assign liability based on specula-
tion and conjecture, which is unfair to the defendant. 33
A court might, however, justify adoption of a possibility standard ei-
ther on the policy ground of spreading the burden of loss when causation
is uncertain, or on the policy ground of deterring negligent treatment of
patients with less than a 50% chance of survival. 34 Some jurisdictions
have advocated a possibility standard of proof in medical malpractice sit-
uations, but their legal bases were flawed or unsupported by precedent. 35
The Pennsylvania case on which Justice Dore based his suggestion that a jury would use the sub-
stantial factor test, Hamil v. Bashline. 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978), did not use a definition of
the substantial factor test different from that of the Resiatemient. Commentary to the Pennsylvania
standard jury instructions indicates that Pennsylvania courts have adopted the Restatement's delini-
tion of the substantial factor test. CIVIL INSTRUCTIONS SUBCOMM . PA SUPREME COURT COMM FOR
PROPOSED STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS. PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION
(CIVIL) § 3.25 Comment (1981) (Last Revision Oct. 1973) (citing Whitner v. Lojeski, 437 Pa. 448.
263 A.2d 889 (1970)).
Washington has explicitly rejected use of the substantial factor test in jury instructions. WASH
SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS. WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) §
15.01 Comment (2d ed. 1980) (citing Blasick v. Yakima, 45 Wn. 2d 309, 274 P.2d 122 (1954))
[Hereinafter cited as WASH. PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS]. Thus, by advocating use of the substantial
factor test, Justice Dore would apparently overrule Blasick.
32. W. PROSSER. supra note 16, § 41. at 241.
33. Id.: O'Donoghue v. Riggs, 73 Wn. 2d 814, 824. 440 P.2d 823. 830 (1968).
34. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
35. Several juridsictions have adopted the language used in Hicks v. United States. 368 F.2d 626
(4th Cir. 1966) as supporting a possibility standard. Jeanes v. Milner. 428 F.2d 598, 605 (8th Cir.
1970); James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 585 (N.D. Cal. 1980). The Hicks court stated. "If
there was any substantial possibility of survival and the defendant has destroyed it. he is answer-
able." Hicks, 368 F.2d at 632.
The language in Hicks was dicta, however, because the Hicks plaintiff could have met a probability
standard of proof. Expert testimony for the plaintiff indicated that the decedent would have survived
if operated upon promptly. Id. Moreover, the Hicks court apparently used the -'possibility" language
merely for the purpose of rejecting a certainty standard of proof. Id.: Herskovits. 99 Wn. 2d at 627.
664 P.2d at 483; King, supra note 20, at 1369 n.53.
Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974). aff d mnem.. 37
N.Y.2d 719. 337 N.E.2d 128. 374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975). supported a possibility standard of proof in
988
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IV. A RESULT-ORIENTED DAMAGE AWARD
If a court chooses to bypass traditional causation principles and adopt a
possibility standard of proof in a Herskovits-type case, it will be faced
with a damages question that also cannot be solved under traditional prin-
ciples. Courts traditionally deal with damages according to an all-or-noth-
ing rule tied to the probability of causation: if the plaintiff can prove that
the defendant probably caused the harm, full damages can be recovered;
if the plaintiff cannot prove probable causation, recovery is denied. 36
If a court adopts a possibility rather than probability standard of proof,
it should at least limit the liability of the defendant to reflect the likelihood
that the defendant caused the injury. Otherwise, the unfairness of using a
lower standard of proof would be exacerbated. In Herskovits, for exam-
ple, Group Health might be found liable under a possibility standard and
forced to pay full damages for Mr. Herskovits' life, as if it had probably
caused Mr. Herskovits' death. Mrs. Herskovits would be overcompen-
sated, and Group Health would be punished. Justice Dore, in a cryptic
discussion of damages, gave no indication that he would adjust the dam-
age award to reflect the uncertainty of causation. 37
One might argue that a court can rely on jurors to use their own sense
of justice to tailor the size of the award to the probability that the defen-
a wrongful death action without relying on the Hicks dicta. The New York court allowed wrongful
death recovery for loss of a 20% to 40% chance of survival. Kallenberg, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 510. The
court did not cite any authority to support this proposition. A later New York case, without overruling
Kallenberg, indicated that Kallenberg did not stand for the proposition that the jury may use a mere
possibility standard. Kimball v. Scors, 59 A.D.2d 984, 399 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351 (1977). In some
contexts, a possibility standard has been approved through legislation. Gardner v. National Bulk
Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963).
Examples of other cases that could be interpreted as supporting a possibility standard of proof are
provided in King, supra note 20, at 1368 n.53. King suggests that these cases' support for the possi-
bility standard of proof is often limited, problematic, or ambiguous. Id. at 1368.
36. King, supra note 20, at 1354.
37. Justice Dore did suggest that a loss of chance damage award should not provide "total recov-
ery" but only recovery based on harm "caused directly by premature death, such as lost earnings and
additional medical expenses, etc." Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 619, 664 P.2d at 479. A clue to the
meaning of these words is found in Justice Dore's approval of the method of damage assessment used
in Chester v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 458 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Herskovits, 99 Wn. 2d at 618, 664
P.2d at 478-79. In Chester, the court based a damage award not on the normal life expectancy of a
person in decedent's actuarial class, but on the life expectancy of a person with the decedent's disease
and personal history. Thus, Justice Dore's statement that a court should not provide "total recovery"
merely seems to draw the distinction between basing a damage award on the life expectancy of an
average, healthy 60-year-old man or a man in Mr. Herskovits' condition.
This distinction is a standard part of the Washington pattern jury instruction on factors to be con-
sidered in a wrongful death damage award. See WASH. PATTERN JURY INsTRUcrTONS. supra note 3 1,
at § 31.02. Justice Dore, therefore, would apparently give a Herskovits jury a standard wrongful
death damage instruction.
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dant caused the harm. 38 Such reliance would be unrealistic, however.
given the emotionally-packed context of a wrongful death action involv-
ing a misdiagnosed cancer patient. The likely result would be a windfall
gain for plaintiffs, and an unmanageable influx of loss of chance suits on
already-crowded court dockets.
Justice Pearson's suggestion of discounting the damage award39 would
be useful in achieving a fairer allocation of the loss. The loss of chance
multiplier represents the likelihood that the defendant was the cause of the
harm. The jury would indicate the proper multiplier figure through a spe-
cial verdict. The court would then apply this muliplier to the value-of-life
figure to compute the amount of damages to be awarded. 40
Although statistics by their nature can never reflect the situation of any
one individual, a trial court should insist that the plaintiff produce evi-
dence that the statistics being used are as closely tailored to the decedent's
circumstances as possible. 4 1 Even so, the court must be willing to accept
38. See Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 Mictl. L. REV 543. 574-76
(1962) (juries use their great latitude in setting the damage award to balance doubtful findings on
other issues such as causation). A jury's common sense damage award is unlikely to be challenged
unless it is outrageously large or small. Id. at 575.
39. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
40. This method of damage assessment, based on a possibility standard, already has been applied
in at least one Washington trial case. In a recent legal malpractice action. Daugert ex rel. Simms v.
Pappas, No. 83-2-00823-5 (Whatcom County Super. Ct. 1984), the plaintiff recovered for a less-
than-50% chance of winning a Petition for Review to the Washington Supreme Court. The testimony
of various expert witnesses as to the possibility of winning ranged from 6% to 50%. "'Loss of
Chance" Applied in Lawyer Malpractice Verdict, 19 Trial News (Official Publication of Wa. State
Trial Lawyers Ass'n) No. 6 at 15 (April 1984). The jury picked a compromise figure. 20%. which it
reported through a special verdict. The judge used this figure as a multiplier to arrive at the final
damage award. Id. at 15.
41. In a Herskovits trial, for example, the discount method should not be applied based on the
14% difference between the 39% and 25% statistical chance of survival figures assumed in the sum-
mary judgment action. A 14% multiplier would be fair only coincidentally. This is because the 14%
figure represents the difference between statistical findings of survival chance at various disease
stages.
The statistical chance of survival at any stage does not necessarily relate to any one patient's indi-
vidual chance of survival at that stage. Justice Brachtenbach discussed the need for patient-specific
facts in his Herskovits dissent. 99 Wn. 2d at 641, 664 P.2d at 490.
For example, the statistics used in Herskovits for stage I and 2 tumors were derived from a pool of
lung cancer patients with the same tumor size and cell-type as Mr. Herskovits. Slack. Chamberlain
and Bross, Predicting Survival Following Surgery for Bronchogenic Carcinoma. 62 CHEST 433. 437
(Table 4) (1972). Beyond those similarities among the study patients. however, the individual pa-
tients possessed differing traits. The effects of the differing traits cancel each other out in the group
figure. On an individual basis, however, they are important.
The authors emphasized that these statistics merely form a base estimate of survival, from which
an intuitive amount should be added or subtracted for other factors that may be influential. id. at 438.
For example, one of the major factors with prognostic significance, the presence or absence of surgi-
cal complications, id. at 434, was not considered in developing the quoted statistical figures. Id. at
436. The authors urged that in determining survival chance for a particular patient. the ability of the
Recovery for "Loss of Chance"
the fact that although the damage multiplier may be adjusted to reflect
individual tendencies, at base it is a statistical figure which is not geared
to the individual patient. This may present a problem regarding require-
ments for certainty as to the amount of damage. The plaintiff is required
to provide a "just and reasonable" basis for estimating damages. 42 This
need not approach mathematical certainty, however; the plaintiff may
only be required to prove the amount of damages with as much accuracy
as is reasonably attainable given the nature of the claim and the circum-
stances. 43
There is no rule as to the degree of certainty required; rather courts Will
accept or reject damage estimates based on the importance they assign to
the vindication of a given claim. 44 If a court is willing, as in Herskovits,
to suspend traditional causation requirements to enable a loss of less-than-
50% chance claim to proceed, it may well be willing to accept damages
based on statistical information not geared to the specific patient. A re-
sult-oriented liability analysis thus leads to an equally result-oriented
damage award.
V. CONCLUSION
Recovery for loss of a less-than-50% chance of survival is not possible
under traditional causation principles. A court wishing to provide recov-
ery may do so only by adopting a possibility standard of proof. The dam-
age award should then be reduced to reflect the probability that the defen-
dant caused the death. Statistical evidence of chance of survival is not
in itself sufficient to make this damage determination. Evidence of
individual patient to withstand surgery should be weighted with the survival prediction derived from
the study. Id. at 437.
The multiplier figure that would be used to represent Mr. Herskovits' individual loss of survival
chance attributable to Group Health would have to be selected by the jury from various options pre-
sented. Presumably, in a Herskovits trial a doctor would testify as to the individual five-year survival
chance of Mr. Herskovits at stage I and stage 2. (Although we know that Mr. Herskovits died within
five years from stage 2, his survival chance at that diagnosis was not necessarily zero. Someone
might have a 98% chance of surviving five years, but still die within five years. The "chance" of
surviving is always accompanied by the "chance" of death, and either one may materialize.) These
figures might be based on a statistical finding but would include consideration of Mr. Herskovits'
individual traits.
Admittedly, this evidence for stage I might be hard or impossible to produce if the patient's medi-
cal records from the time the disease should have been diagnosed are inadequate to supply such
information. An opposing expert might testify that different figures should be used at either stage.
The jury would consider all the figures presented and choose from among them, or choose a compro-
mise figure, to arrive at the proper figure.
42. D. DOBBS. HANDBOOK ON THE LAWOF REMEDIES § 3.3, at 151 (1973).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 152.
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discrepancies between the patient's individual condition and the condi-
tions of study-group patients in statistical findings must be considered.
Even then, a court must be willing to accept a damage figure ultimately
based on statistical information which is not specific to the individual pa-
tient.
Linda M. Roubik
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